infection to define the temporal relationship between reported cases in animals and humans. Generally, human cases preceded animal cases at a country-level, supporting the potential of H1N1 infection to be a ''reverse zoonosis'', and the value of integrating human and animal disease report data.
The majority of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic in origin, including recently emerging influenza viruses such as the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A epidemic (Krauss 2003) . The virus contained viral sequences related to human, avian, and swine lineages (Garten et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2009 ). It had a greater transmissibility than seasonal flu (Fraser et al. 2009 ), and caused significant fear around the world. While Mexico was one of the earliest countries with known outbreaks, the precise origin of the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A epidemic remains unclear (Fraser et al. 2009 ). The epidemic affected both human and animal populations as it spread globally.
In fact, before the end of 2009, 14 different countries indicated that they had swine infected with the virus (Mathieu et al. 2010) .
To better predict and prepare for future epidemics, greater integration of human and animal disease surveillance has been recommended (Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee on Achieving Sustainable Global Capacity for Surveillance and Response to Emerging Diseases of Zoonotic Origin and Keusch 2009). In fact, a systematic review by Vbova et al. (2010) found that of surveillance systems that collected human or animal data, only around 19% collected data on both. In order to better understand the zoonotic nature of the epidemic and the relationship between human and animal surveillance data streams, we compared for 2009, by country, the date of the initial report of human cases of the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A epidemic infection to the first report of disease in animals in that country.
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Our source for human case reports of the 2009 swineorigin H1N1 influenza A epidemic infection was the HealthMap project (Brownstein and Freifeld 2007; Brownstein et al. 2008 ), a real-time monitoring system for emerging infectious diseases that had created a global online database for the H1N1 epidemic. To find the first report of human disease in a particular country, we used the first date identified by HealthMap from any source (formal or informal). For reports of the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A epidemic in animals, we used the EM-PRES-i database, a global animal surveillance system maintained by United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Welte and Vargas Teran 2004; FAO 2010) , and noted the date when infection was first reported in an animal population in a particular country.
We also examined the effect of two additional countrylevel covariates, gross domestic product (GDP) and density of swine in each country, on the difference in days between first animal and human case reports in that country. We chose to analyze density of swine because swine were an infected host in 83% of the first animal reports, by country, in EMPRES-i ( A total of 157 countries reported human cases. Twenty-one countries reported both animal and human outbreaks (Fig. 1) . No countries reported only animal cases.
The time between first human and animal cases varied from almost simultaneous to more than 7 months ( Table 2 ). The mean of the time lag was 143 days with a standard deviation of 65 days. In the case that was almost simultaneous (Canada), the subsequent investigation revealed early cases of human H1N1 infection had returned to the country from Mexico and then contacted livestock that became ill (OIE 2009) . The fact that the animal case was reported before the human index case could be interpreted as an indicator of a very sensitive and timely animal surveillance network in that country. Countries where the time lag was relatively smaller (such as Chile and Argentina) may have sensitive surveillance, increased contact between humans and animals, or both.
We also analyzed the effect of our two covariates, country GDP and swine density on the difference in days between animal and human case reports. The results of the linear regression model indicate that swine density had a statistically significant impact with the difference in days (P = 0.01), while country GDP was not a significant predictor of the time lag (P = 0.86). When swine density was broken up into the quartiles low, medium, medium-high, and high density, three of the four categories were significantly associated with the time lag between human and animal cases (with greater swine density associated with a longer lag). The medium density category was not significant (P = 0.778).
There has been little very little integration in general between human and animal disease surveillance of the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A epidemic. Our comparison of a human and animal surveillance databases for infection indicates that as the epidemic spread, human cases preceded animal cases in countries, supporting the assumption that human-to-human transmission was driving disease spread. At the same time, many countries reported subsequent animal cases, indicating that ''reverse zoonotic'' transmission may have been occurring. However, additional work is needed to confirm this notion including the use of variables such as information related to human movement within infected areas as well as biological evidence that virus was not circulating before the dates reported. In addition, since there is evidence to suggest that the origin of the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A epidemic is from swine (Smith et al. 2009 ), another characterization of this phenomena is that of a spillback, where a virus is transmitted back into the original host from intermediate hosts (humans in this case). The comparison of human and animal surveillance data streams may also point out gaps in surveillance systems and delays in reporting. For example, Hosseini et al. (2010) found that countries with lower resource settings tended to have delays in reporting. Our analysis showed GDP not to impact the difference in days between reporting of animal and human cases. In addition other papers have examined GDP and reporting and found mixed results. For example, Reperant et al. (2010) compared GDP per inhabitant of countries in Europe that reported cases of H5N1 in wild birds versus all of Europe and found no significance. However, Brownstein et al. (2010) used their HealthMap system to examine reports of 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza A and found that wealthier countries had shorter lag times between suspected and confirmed reports of human cases. Finally, there is the potential for GDP to bias reporting time of animal cases because of the perceived economic impact to livestock trade. We found that country-level swine density was positively associated with a longer time lag between the reporting of human and swine cases. Explanations for this could include greater biosecurity in countries with higher swine density, less effective surveillance, or alternatively, a reluctance to report swine cases due to economic considerations.
In attempting to compare animal and human disease surveillance data, a key issue is the different factors driving the effectiveness of such surveillance in humans versus animals. Animal disease surveillance is often closely tied to economic factors and international trade in animal products (Ndiva Mongoh et al. 2008) , while human disease surveillance is primarily a public health function. Concerns over infected food could cause significant financial impact for many years after an outbreak. Therefore, responses of the animal and human surveillance networks to an epidemic with zoonotic potential may differ for a number of reasons. Our analysis shows the feasibility of making such comparisons and the need for further investigation when there are large discrepancies between the data streams. Finally, creating an integrated surveillance system requires involvement of agencies at different levels from the local community to global agencies of health (Perry et al. 2007 ). These agencies must be involved at different levels of the surveillance processes from identification of a health issue to the response and feedback on that issue (Perry et al. 2007 ). Thus for zoonotic disease surveillance including influenza there needs to be strong integration of animal and human agencies of health at the local, state, and countrylevel including wildlife, agriculture, and public health, as well as a shared willingness to overcome barriers to reporting in all species.
